State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. James W. Mooney, aka James W.B.E. Mooney,
Linda T. Mooney, and Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church of Utah, Inc.,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 20010787
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
2004 UT 49, 98 P.3d 420, 502 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 2004)
June 22, 2004, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Released for Publication January 06, 2005.
PRIOR HISTORY: Fourth District, Provo Dep't. The Honorable Gary
D. Stott.
COUNSEL: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Kris C. Leonard, Asst.
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, and David H. T. Wayment, Provo, for plaintiff.
Kathryn Collard, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
JUDGES: PARRISH, Justice. Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief
Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's
opinion.
OPINION BY: PARRISH
OPINION
[**422] PARRISH, Justice:
[*P1] James and Linda Mooney, along with their church, the Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American
Church (collectively, the "Mooneys"), have been charged by the
State with multiple felony counts of "engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise"
and of engaging in a "pattern of unlawful activity" by possessing and
distributing peyote, a controlled substance, to members and visitors in their religious
services. The State also seeks forfeiture of the church's property in connection
with this alleged criminal activity. The Mooneys moved to dismiss the charges, arguing
that a federal regulatory exemption incorporated into Utah law permits them to use
and distribute peyote in "bona fide religious ceremonies" because they
are members of the Native American Church. The Mooneys also argued that if state
law is not interpreted to permit their possession and use of peyote for religious
purposes, their prosecution violates their constitutional right to freely exercise
their religion, as well as their constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the law.
[*P2] The trial court rejected the Mooneys' arguments, holding that the Mooneys
are not entitled to the protection of any [**423] exemption for
the religious use of peyote because they are not members of a federally recognized
Native American tribe. We reverse the trial court's decision, holding that Utah
law incorporates a federal regulation exempting from prosecution members of the
Native American Church who use peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies. On its
face, the federal regulation does not restrict the exemption to members of federally
recognized tribes. We therefore rule that the exemption is available to all members
of the Native American Church. Any other interpretation is not only inconsistent
with the plain language of the exemption, but would fail to provide members of the
Native American Church with constitutionally adequate notice that their religious
use of peyote could expose them to criminal liability.
BACKGROUND
Regulation of Peyote
[*P3] A cactus indigenous to the Rio Grande valley of southern Texas and northern
Mexico, peyote contains mescaline, which can induce hallucinations and other psychedelic
effects in those who consume it. There is a long tradition among some Native American
groups of worshiping peyote and of consuming the cactus and experiencing its effects
in religious ceremonies. See
Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh,
922 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp.
1333, 1335 (D.N.M. 1991); Native Am. Church v. United States, 468 F. Supp.
1247, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Christopher Parker, Note and Comment, A Constitutional
Examination of the Federal Exemptions for Native American Religious Peyote Use,
16 BYU J. Pub. L. 89, 89-94 (2001).
[*P4] Congress first restricted the possession and sale of peyote in the Drug Abuse
Control Amendments of 1965, and classified it as a Schedule I controlled substance
in 1970. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) Schedule I(c)(12) (2004); Boyll, 774 F. Supp.
at 1338; Native Am. Church, 468 F. Supp. at 1249. In 1965 and again in 1970,
there were efforts in Congress to enact an explicit statutory exception for the
use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies.
Id. These efforts did
not succeed, but they led the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the predecessor
to the agency now known as the Drug Enforcement Agency (the "DEA"), to
promulgate a regulatory exemption for the religious use of peyote.
Id.
That exemption provides as follows:
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to
the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American
Church, and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt from
registration. Any person who manufactures peyote for or distributes peyote to a
Native American Church is required to register annually and to comply with all other
requirements of law.
21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2004). Throughout this opinion, we will refer to this regulatory
exemption as the Religious Peyote Exemption, or simply as the federal exemption.
[*P5] The religious use of peyote in Native American religious ceremonies became
a frequent topic of debate after the United States Supreme Court decided the case
of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). In Smith, the
Court held that the state of Oregon did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution when it refused unemployment
benefits to certain practitioners of Native American peyote religion who had been
fired for illegally using peyote. Id. at 890. The Court announced that
a neutral law of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious
practice. Id. at 878-80.
[*P6] The Smith decision generated a great deal of controversy and motivated
Congress to legislate in response. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Reversal of Roles, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 611,
613-14. One of these responses was the adoption of the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act Amendments (the "AIRFA Amendments") in 1994. These amendments
were based on the following congressional findings:
The Congress finds and declares that--
(1) for many Indian people, the traditional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus
as a religious sacrament has for centuries been integral to a way of life, and significant
in perpetuating Indian tribes and cultures;
(2) since 1965, this ceremonial use of peyote by Indians has been protected by Federal
regulation;
(3) while at least 28 States have enacted laws which are similar to, or are in conformance
with, the Federal regulation which protects the ceremonial use of peyote by Indian
religious practitioners, 22 States have not done so, and this lack of uniformity
has created hardship for Indian people who participate in such religious ceremonies;
(4) the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), held that the First Amendment
does not protect Indian practitioners who use peyote in Indian religious ceremonies,
and also raised uncertainty whether this religious practice would be protected under
the compelling State interest standard; and
(5) the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the religious use of peyote
by Indians may serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and
increase the risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment.
42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a) (2004). On the basis of these findings, Congress directed that
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transportation
of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection
with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited
by the United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or discriminated
against on the basis of such use, possession or transportation, including, but not
limited to, denial of otherwise applicable benefits under public assistance programs.
Id. § 1996a(b)(1). For the purposes of these provisions, Congress defined the term
"Indian" to include members of "any tribe, band, nation, pueblo,
or other organized group or community of Indians . . . which is recognized as eligible
for the special programs and [**424] services provided by the United
States to Indians because of their status as Indians." Id. § 1996a(c)(2).
The Mooneys and the Native American Church
[*P7] The Native American Church was formally established in Oklahoma in 1918.
Peyote
Way, 922 F.2d at 1212. The formation of this entity was motivated, at least
in part, to protect the religious use of peyote from early attempts to suppress
it. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. at 1336. The Native American Church has now grown
to include many local branches or chapters, including, according to the Mooneys,
the defendant
Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church.
[*P8] James Mooney claims to be a descendant of Native Americans, but is not a member
of any federally recognized tribe. The Mooneys practiced Native American religion
before founding their church, and provided religious programs and services to inmates
of Utah correctional facilities, both as volunteers and, in Mr. Mooney's case, as
an employee. James and Linda Mooney founded their Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American
Church in April of 1997 in Benjamin, Utah. Because Texas is the only state
in the nation in which peyote is grown, the Mooneys obtained peyote for use in their
church services by registering and complying with the requirements of the Texas
Department of Public Safety Narcotics Services.
ANALYSIS
I. INCORPORATION OF THE RELIGIOUS PEYOTE
EXEMPTION INTO THE UTAH CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT
[*P9] The first issue we address is whether the federal Religious Peyote Exemption
has been incorporated into Utah law. The Utah Controlled Substances Act (the "Act")
provides:
"Controlled Substance" means a drug or substance included in Schedules
I, II, III, IV or V of [Utah Code] Section 58-37-4, and also includes a drug or
substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal Controlled Substances
Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, or any controlled substances analog.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(e)(i) (2002). While peyote is among the controlled substances
listed in Schedule I of section 58-37-4 of the Utah Code, the preamble to Schedule
I provides an exception for substances that are "specifically excepted"
or "listed in another schedule." Id. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) (2002). We must
decide whether this qualifying language incorporates the federal Religious Peyote
Exemption of 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 into state law. This is a question of statutory
interpretation that we review for correctness without deference to the conclusions
of the trial court. See Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah
1990). [Footnote 1]
[*P10] We hold that the federal exemption for the religious use of peyote in bona
fide ceremonies of the Native American Church constitutes a "specific exception"
to the listing of peyote as a controlled substance within the meaning of Utah Code
section 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii). To interpret the statute otherwise would create a direct
conflict with a preemptive federal law, and would raise substantial constitutional
impediments to the State's prosecution of the Mooneys.
[*P11] Our primary source of guidance in statutory interpretation is the plain and
ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Dick Simon Trucking, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 2004 UT 11, P 17, 84 P.3d 1197. Unfortunately, the language of
the Utah Controlled Substances Act fails to specify the source of the applicable
exceptions. Although the Act explicitly provides that scheduled substances are controlled
unless "specifically excepted," Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii) (2002),
it does not address whether the contemplated exceptions are found in [**425]
state statutes, state regulations, federal statutes, federal regulations, or some
combination of these sources. [Footnote 2] Similarly, although the Act states that
scheduled substances are controlled "unless listed in another schedule,"
id. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii), it neither specifies the other contemplated schedules
nor addresses the resolution of conflicts arising when a particular substance is
listed as controlled on one schedule but listed as exempt under another schedule.
In short, the statute does not address the situation presented here, where the substance
in question is listed as a controlled substance under one of the state schedules
but is listed as exempt under the federal schedules that have been incorporated
by reference into the Utah Controlled Substances Act. See id. § 58-37-3. These omissions
and inconsistencies render the statutory language ambiguous and require that we
turn to other accepted principles of statutory construction.
A. Preemption by the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act Amendments
[*P12] In construing statutes, we are obligated to "avoid interpretations that
conflict with relevant constitutional mandates." State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991,
1009 (Utah 1995). This canon of interpretation has sometimes been couched as a recognition
that "we have a duty to construe statutes to avoid constitutional conflicts."
Provo City Corp. v. State, 795 P.2d 1120, 1125 (Utah 1990); see also State
v. Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1983) ("It is the duty of
this Court to construe a statute to avoid constitutional infirmities whenever possible.
We must adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional
infirmity." (quotation and citations omitted)).
[*P13] The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress
to preempt state law in areas covered by federal legislation, rendering invalid
any state statute that conflicts with a federal act of preemption. U.S. Const. art.
VI, cl. 2;
Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158, 55 L. Ed. 2d 179, 98 S.
Ct. 988 (1978). We therefore avoid interpreting an ambiguous state statute in a
way that would render the statute invalid under an explicitly preemptive federal
law. See Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Minn. 2002) (interpreting
a state statute to avoid conflicting with a preemptive federal law).
[*P14]
The AIRFA Amendments' prohibition on criminalizing the religious use of
peyote constitutes a clear congressional act of preemption against the laws of any
state that might otherwise prohibit the use of peyote for religious purposes by
Native Americans, as the AIRFA Amendments define them. The AIRFA Amendments provide
that "notwithstanding any other . . . law, the use, possession, or transportation
of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection
with the practice of a traditional Indian religion . . . shall not be prohibited
by . . . any State." 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2004). Were we to hold that the
Utah Controlled Substances Act does not incorporate the federal Religious Peyote
Exemption, the Act would prohibit peyote use in all circumstances, thereby running
afoul of the AIRFA Amendments. We therefore are persuaded to interpret the Utah
Controlled Substances Act to have incorporated the exemption for the religious use
of peyote found at 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31.
[*P15] The State urges us to hold that the Utah Controlled Substances Act does not
incorporate the federal exemption and suggests that we resolve the resulting preemption
problem by holding that the AIRFA Amendments preempt Utah law only to the extent
that Utah law criminalizes peyote use by members of federally recognized Native
American tribes. This interpretation would leave Utah law available for prosecution
of those religious peyote users, such as the Mooneys, who are not members of a federally
recognized tribe. While the interpretation advocated by the State would facilitate
the result it desires, such an interpretation nevertheless would require that we
find the Utah Controlled Substances Act in conflict [**426] with
federal law. We decline to do so in the face of an equally plausible interpretation
that avoids any such conflict.
B. Constitutional Guarantees of Due Process
[*P16] The statutory interpretation urged by the State is also untenable because
it raises a serious question as to whether the Mooneys' constitutional due process
rights would be violated by a conviction. In this regard, we are again constrained
by the principle of statutory construction counseling us to avoid interpretations
that are inconsistent with constitutional guarantees. [Footnote 3] Mohi,
901 P.2d at 1009; Provo City Corp., 795 P.2d at 1125; Lindquist,
674 P.2d at 1237.
[*P17] Both the United States and Utah Constitutions protect citizens from deprivation
of liberty or property absent due process of law. U.S. Const. amends. V & XIV,
§ 1; Utah Const. art. I, § 7. The Utah Controlled Substances Act imposes substantial
criminal penalties on those found guilty of violating its provisions. Our constitutional
guarantees of due process require that penal statutes define criminal offenses "with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited."
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 103 S. Ct. 1855
(1983); State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, PP 13-14, 84 P.3d 1171; see also
In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, P 37, 86 P.3d 712 ("Utah's
constitutional guarantee of due process is substantially the same as the due process
guarantees contained in the . . . United States Constitution." (quotations
and citations omitted)). These guarantees do not permit enforcement of a statute
that forbids an act "in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at [the statute's] meaning and differ as to its application."
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 137 L. Ed. 2d 432, 117 S. Ct.
1219 (1997) (quotations and citations omitted); see also MacGuire, 2004
UT 4 at P 14.
[*P18] Because the Utah Controlled Substances Act does not clearly specify whether
it incorporates the Religious Peyote Exemption, a holding that the exemption does
not apply would give rise to serious constitutional claims under the due process
clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The ambiguity in the statute is
such that the scope of its peyote prohibition cannot be decisively interpreted by
lawyers, to say nothing of citizens untrained in the law. This weighs strongly against
any interpretation that would enable the State to initiate criminal prosecution
based on arguably legitimate conduct.
[*P19] In summary, we interpret the Utah Controlled Substances Act to have incorporated
the Religious Peyote Exemption found at 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31. This interpretation
avoids a conflict with the preemptive AIRFA Amendments. It also
avoids the constitutional due process claims that would be created by allowing the
State to prosecute the Mooneys under a statute that may reasonably be read to have
permitted their religious activities.
II. INTERPRETING THE PEYOTE EXEMPTION IN UTAH LAW
[*P20] Having held that the federal exemption for religious peyote use is incorporated
into Utah law, we must decide whether the terms of the exemption protect the Mooneys
from prosecution. This task requires that we look first at the plain meaning of
the regulatory language, and give effect to that meaning unless the language is
ambiguous. Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt., 2004 UT 12 P 9, 84 P.3d 1201.
A. The Plain Meaning of the Religious Peyote Exemption
[*P21] The State argues that the Religious Peyote Exemption is available only to
members of federally recognized Native American tribes. The Mooneys contend that
the exemption is not so limited. The exemption states that it applies to "members
of the [**427] Native American Church," provided such members
are using peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies. James Mooney asserts that his
church is one of many chapters or churches that make up the Native American Church,
that the peyote was used in bona fide religious ceremonies and that, in acquiring
peyote from Texas, his church has registered and otherwise followed the applicable
regulations of the Texas Department of Public Safety and the United States DEA.
These assertions remain unchallenged on appeal.
[*P22] Because the text of the exemption is devoid of any reference to tribal status,
we find no support for an interpretation limiting the exemption to tribal members.
See Boyll, 774 F. Supp. at 1338 (holding that under the plain language
of the federal Religious Peyote Exemption, the exemption applies to all members
of the Native American Church, regardless of any tribal affiliation). The term "members"
in the exemption clearly refers to members of the "Native American Church"--not
to members of federally recognized tribes. Therefore, so long as their church is
part of "the Native American Church," the Mooneys may not be prosecuted
for using peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies.
B. Deference to the Federal Agency's Interpretation
[*P23] In arguing that we should limit the applicability of the Religious Peyote
Exemption to members of federally recognized tribes, the State maintains that we
should defer to the interpretation of the DEA, the successor to the federal agency
that promulgated the exemption. The State argues that the DEA applies the federal
exemption only to members of federally recognized tribes.
[*P24] We will defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation only if
it is a reasonable interpretation of the regulatory language. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court has required that federal courts defer to the regulatory interpretation
of a federal agency only if the language of the regulation "is not free from
doubt" and if the interpretation is "reasonable" and "sensibly
conforms to the wording and purpose" of the regulation.
Martin v. OSHRC,
499 U.S. 144, 150-51, 113 L.Ed. 2d 117, 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991) (citations and quotations
omitted). No deference is otherwise required.
[*P25] Whether a federal court must defer to the regulatory interpretation of a
federal agency presents a different question from whether a state court is required
to defer to a federal agency's interpretation of a federal regulation incorporated
into state law. In the latter case, although we are free to consider the interpretation
of a federal agency, we have no obligation to defer to that interpretation. In this
case, in view of the plain language of the federal exemption and the due process
concerns raised by the prosecution of Native American [**428] Church
members whose activities fall within its plain language, we will not defer to any
agency interpretation that would limit the federal exemption to members of federally
recognized tribes.
C. Federal Policy Toward Native Americans
[*P26] Finally, the State argues that an interpretation extending the federal exemption
to members of the Native American Church who are not members of federally recognized
tribes would violate the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, because
the exemption would be a religion-based preference permitting members of a particular
church, and not others, to use peyote in religious ceremonies. The State maintains
that an exemption for members of federally recognized tribes can survive constitutional
scrutiny because it is a political preference designed to preserve tribal culture,
rather than a constitutionally suspect racial preference. [Footnote 4]
[*P27] The State relies on
Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1212, where the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the federal Equal Protection Clause permits the
Religious Peyote Exemption's preference for Native American Church members because
of the federal government's unique political relationship with Native American tribes,
and that the Equal Protection Clause does not require that the exemption be extended
to religious peyote users who are neither Native American Church members nor members
of federally recognized tribes. See also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving
Congress the power to regulate commerce with the "Indian Tribes");
Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 41 L. Ed. 2d 290, 94 S. Ct. 2474 (1974)
(recognizing the "unique legal status" of Native American tribes with
respect to the federal government). The State therefore urges a regulatory interpretation
that would limit the peyote exemption to members of federally recognized tribes,
because a preference for such tribe members receives deference under the Supreme
Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
[*P28] These arguments do not persuade us to interpret the Religious Peyote Exemption
in a way that contravenes the plain meaning of its terms. It is particularly important,
as a safeguard for our citizens' due process rights, for us to remain faithful to
the plain language of a statute when it would impose criminal penalties on those
who violate it. While the constitutional arguments advanced by the State may be
relevant to our statutory analysis, they are speculative and remote when compared
with the tangible due process claims that the Mooneys would have were they to be
prosecuted in violation of the plain language of the exemption. [Footnote 5]
[*P29] We also recognize that this case involves a prosecution under state, rather
than federal, law. It is by no means clear that the federal government's duties
to Native Americans, see
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551, would legitimize state
efforts to limit religious preferences to members of federally recognized Native
American tribes. It is similarly unclear whether an interpretation that extended
the religious peyote exemption to only some members of the Native American Church
would survive scrutiny under article I, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, which
provides that "the State shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Accordingly, despite the State's
argument that some hypothetical equal protection claims might be leveled against
the plain language interpretation we adopt today, we are constrained to interpret
the incorporated regulation according to its plain meaning.
CONCLUSION
[*P30] We reverse the decision of the district court. We hold that the federal Religious
Peyote Exemption found at 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 has been incorporated into the Utah
Controlled Substances Act. Although the statutory language governing incorporation
is ambiguous, we interpret the Act in a manner that avoids a conflict with federal
law and does not risk depriving the Mooneys of their constitutional rights to due
process.
[*P31] In interpreting the reach of the federal exemption as incorporated into Utah
law, we rely on its plain language, electing not to defer to a contrary interpretation
that the State argues has been adopted by the federal DEA. On its face, the exemption
applies to members of the Native American Church, without regard to tribal membership.
The bona fide religious use of peyote cannot serve as the basis for prosecuting
members of the Native American Church under state law. We remand for reconsideration
of the Mooneys' motion to dismiss in light of this opinion.
[*P32] Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, and
Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's opinion.