JACQUELYN RENEE TOWN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA ex
rel. JANET RENO, as State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Florida, in and for Dade County, Florida, and
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a Florida municipal corporation,
Respondents
No. 55987
Supreme Court of Florida
377 So. 2d 648; 1979 Fla. LEXIS 4829
November 1, 1979
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [**1]
Rehearing Denied January 8, 1980.
COUNSEL:
Milton M. Ferrell, Jr., Arthur C. Massey, Jr. and Richard R. Booth, of
Ferrell & Ferrell, Miami, for petitioner.
Arthur Joel Berger and Bayar W. Heath, Asst. State's Attys., Miami, and
Robert L. Shevin, City Atty., and Beth Ellen Spiegel, Asst. City Atty., Miami
Beach, for respondents.
JUDGES:
Before OVERTON, J. ENGLAND, C.J., ADKINS, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ.,
Concur BOYD, J., Concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion
OPINIONBY:
OVERTON
OPINION:
[*649]
This cause is before us on a petition for writ of certiorari to review a
temporary injunction granted by the circuit court of Dade County enjoining the
use of cannabis on residential property owned by Jacquelyn Renee Town and
enjoining the use of said property as a church for the Ethiopian Zion Coptic
Church. In entering this injunction, the trial court directly and initially
construed the first amendment of the United States Constitution. We have
jurisdiction to review this interlocutory order by writ of certiorari. Art. V,
§ 3(b)(3), Fla.Const.
For the reasons subsequently expressed in this opinion, we affirm the action
of the trial judge.
The parties agree and the trial [**2] court expressly found that: (1) the
Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church represents a religion within the first amendment
to the Constitution of the United States; (2) the "use of cannabis is an
essential portion of the religious practice"; (3) petitioner is the owner of a
residence located at 43 Star Island, Miami Beach, which she received as a gift
from an elder of the church; (4) petitioner's residence was frequented daily by
members of the church and others who congregated to worship; (5) under the
beliefs of the church, cannabis, a controlled substance, is frequently and
freely used; (6) cannabis is not itself an object of worship; (7) prayer is
directed solely to a spiritual god; (8) members of the church believe that
cannabis is the mystical body and blood of "Jes-us"; and (9) through cannabis
members purportedly find a spirit of love, unity, and justice, which brings
them closer to their god.
The findings further reflect that the use of cannabis is not restricted to
members of the church. Instead, it is freely given to children and adults,
members and nonmembers. Checks on distribution of cannabis to nonbelievers in
the faith are minimal, and no efforts are made to ascertain whether [**3]
visiting nonmembers are truly interested in learning more about the faith.
Nonmembers are not required to undergo any religious training prior to being
permitted to share in the use of cannabis. The record and findings also
establish that cannabis is continually smoked throughout the waking hours,
independent of prayer services or religious rituals. Members partake of
cannabis anywhere, not just within the confines of a church facility. Further,
the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church is not a new church or religion but the record
reflects it is centuries old and has regularly used cannabis as its sacrament.
The trial court balanced the state's interests in protecting the public health,
welfare, safety, and morals against the petitioner's interests in the free
exercise of her religion and found injunctive relief proper. The trial court
also found that petitioner's property was used as a church in violation of the
zoning ordinances of the City of Miami Beach. For [*650] this reason, the
court enjoined further use of petitioner's property as a church but permitted
Ms. Town to worship in her home with family and friends.
I. The Use of Cannabis as a Religious Practice.
The first [**4] amendment precludes the enactment of laws which prohibit
the free exercise of religion. Laws may never restrict religious belief;
however, religious practices may be subject to governmental regulation in
limited instances. E. g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10
L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963). To justify the regulation of a particular religious
practice, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest. Id.; McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 98 S. Ct. 1322, 55 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1978); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972).
The record substantiated the trial court's findings that the church was a
religion within the first amendment, that petitioner sincerely subscribed to
the beliefs of the church, and that the use of cannabis was an integral part of
the religion. The issue before this Court is whether the State of Florida has a
compelling interest in restricting the use of cannabis as a religious practice.
It is well established that the state may restrict religious practices which
pose a serious threat to the health of the citizenry. Thus, the Supreme Court
of the United States long ago held that one might be compelled to be vaccinated
[**5] against a disease despite religious objection. Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905). Other courts
have upheld the state's right to protect children by requiring emergency
medical treatment over a parent's religious objection. E. g., In re Sampson,
29 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686, 278 N.E.2d 918 (1972); Jehovah's Witnesses v.
King County Hospital, 390 U.S. 598, 88 S. Ct. 1260, 20 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1968).
Restriction on the handling of poisonous snakes and drinking poison as a
religious practice has also been upheld. State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.
2d 99 (Tenn.1975), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954, 96 S. Ct. 1429, 47 L. Ed. 2d 360
(1976).
In Hamilton v. State, 366 So.2d 8 (Fla.1978), this Court reexamined the
classification of cannabis as a controlled substance and upheld the statutory
scheme regulating its use, reasoning:
There continues to be authority supporting the position that the
health hazards of cannabis justify its proscription and its present
classification. Although there is substantial expert opinion to the
contrary, the fact that there continues to be expert opinion
supporting the reasons which prompted the Legislature to enact [**6]
this statute is sufficient to constitute a continuing rational
basis for the act.
Id. at 10. Petitioner contends that the legislative enactment of section 402.36,
Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.), which allows cannabis to be used in medical
research as the effect of making the classification of cannabis as a Schedule I
drug under section 893.03, Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.), irrational and in
effect requires this Court to recede from its Hamilton decision. We disagree.
In classifying cannabis as a Schedule I drug, the legislature expressly stated
that cannabis "has a high potential for abuse and has no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States, and in its use under medical
supervision Does not meet accepted safety standards." § 893.03(1), Fla.Stat.
(1978 Supp.) (emphasis added).
By enacting section 402.36, the legislature was permitting the drug to be
used for research only under strictly controlled circumstances in order to
determine how, if at all, it could properly be used in medical treatment. This
act in no way makes the legislative classification of cannabis arbitrary or
unreasonable. We reaffirm our decision in Hamilton. Although Hamilton [**7]
is not dispositive of the instant case, it does establish for the State of
Florida that cannabis remains a dangerous drug. This fact was also established
independently in the instant case through the testimony of expert witnesses.
This evidence, coupled with the indiscriminate use of the drug by Ms. [*651]
Town and the followers of the church, convinces us that the state has sustained
its burden. The testimony of an eleven-year-old boy exemplifies our concern.
This boy testified that he went to petitioner's residence three times within
two months after hearing that cannabis was smoked there. The boy, who had
previously smoked cannabis, was admitted with a friend after telling a guard
that they had come to pray. Each time he visited he was given a "spliff," a
combination of cannabis and tobacco. He did not have to pray during his visits
though members sometimes talked to him about god. This easy access to cannabis
for a child who had absolutely no interest in learning the religion, coupled
with the indiscriminate use of the drug by members of the church, clearly
warrants intervention by the state.
Petitioner cites People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69,
394 P.2d [**8] 813 (1964), in which the California Supreme Court held that the
state could not constitutionally proscribe the use of peyote by Navajo Indians
as a part of their religion. This case is not controlling and is
distinguishable. The California court found the use of peyote by an ancient
Indian religious group in the desert outweighed the state's interest in
proscribing use of the drug. Accord State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz.App. 27, 504
P.2d 950 (Ct.App.1973), Cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946, 94 S. Ct. 3071, 41 L. Ed.
2d 667 (1974); Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okl.Ct.Crim.App.1977). In
Woody the use of peyote was restricted to adults, and it was used only during a
particular ceremony. In the instant case the use of cannabis by members and
nonmembers of the church continues throughout the day and is wholly
unrestricted. The record further reflects that children and nonmembers are not
only permitted to use cannabis but also are encouraged to do so by adult
members.
Woody is also distinguishable in that the court expressly found that the
peyote users posed no threat to the general public while under that drug's
influence. Peyote was used during a ceremony, conducted in the desert, which
[**9] continued from sundown Saturday to sunrise Sunday. At sunrise breakfast
was served, and then the members departed. By morning the effects of the peyote
had disappeared with no aftereffects. In the instant case the record contains
testimony of neighbors stating that participants under the influence of cannabis
were constantly coming and going. An officer who often observed the activities
at petitioner's residence testified that he would usually see fifteen to twenty
cars parked on the premises. This evidence coupled with evidence of the use of
cannabis at all times of the day leads to the inescapable conclusion that
participants traveling from petitioner's residence in fact posed a threat to
public safety and welfare.
Although we find the Woody decision distinguishable from the instant
case, we recognize, as the California court did, that: "(T)he right to free
religious expression embodies a precious heritage of our history. In a mass
society, which presses at every point toward conformity, the protection of a
self expression, however unique, of the individual and the group becomes ever
more important." 61 Cal.2d at 727, 40 Cal.Rptr. at 77, 394 P.2d at 821. In the
instant case, [**10] however, we find that the state's compelling interest
outweighs the free exercise interests of the petitioner. To hold otherwise
would, for all practical purposes, legalize the use of cannabis for anyone,
member or nonmember of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, who came to
petitioner's residence to use the prohibited drug.
II. Violation of City Zoning Ordinances.
The second facet of the temporary injunction prohibits Ms. Town from
using her residence as a church in violation of Miami Beach zoning ordinances.
We concur with the trial court's finding that the residence was indeed serving
as a center of operations for the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church. At least three
times a day members of the church would gather in the main building to pray.
Prayer meetings would consist of chanting and singing and would sometimes last
for several hours. Testimony of several neighbors revealed that approximately
thirty people participated in [*652] the regular prayer sessions. Ms. Town
did not contest, either in her written brief or at oral argument, the trial
court's finding that the church was in violation of the city's zoning. Rather,
she argued that (1) the zoning ordinances must yield [**11] to the first
amendment, and (2) the trial court's injunctive order was unconstitutionally
vague. She contends that enforcement of this order will necessitate
impermissible governmental entanglement. See, e. g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971).
We reject both arguments. The petitioner never sought a zoning exception
and did not question the general authority of the city to zone this property.
Further, the land was so zoned prior to its purchase for church purposes. The
authority of a city or county to reasonably regulate the location of churches
has previously been approved by this Court. See Pylant v. Orange County, 328
So.2d 199 (Fla.1976); United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany v. City of Miami
Beach, 82 So.2d 880 (Fla.1955). Under the circumstances set forth in this record,
we believe the temporary injunction prohibiting the use of the property
identified as 43 Star Island as a church was entirely reasonable and proper and
was not unconstitutionally vague.
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with [**12] an
opinion.
CONCURBY:
BOYD (In part)
DISSENTBY:
BOYD (In part)
DISSENT:
BOYD, Justice, concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion to the extent that it does not conflict
with People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964). I
dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which totally forbids the use
of cannabis by the Coptic Church. In my opinion the state cannot totally
prohibit such a practice but may impose reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions calculated to protect children and the general public from adverse
effects stemming from the practice.
Bona fide members who are adults have a right to worship in the manner that
the Coptic Church has done for centuries before the adoption of the United
States Constitution or the discovery of America.
I would remand this cause to the trial court with directions to permit bona
fide members to use marijuana in actual worship services in a properly zoned
church location, subject to the condition that they do not operate automobiles
while under the influence of the drug. The court should designate the persons
who are to distribute and receive the drug and require strict [**13]
accounting to prevent misuse of the sacrament.
The courts have a duty to balance the right of free exercise of religion
with the right of society to be protected from adverse results of such
religious activities.